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On 5 and 6 July 2019, the four member states of the Pacific Alliance (PA) 
will meet in Lima, Peru, for the XIV Presidential Summit. With the rapidly 
changing both Latin American and international context, the meeting might 
well be the most important one since the group’s creation in 2011. The con-
vergence with the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the accession 
of associate members, and enhanced cooperation with observer states are 
among the main topics on the agenda.
 • The “pink tide,” the name given to the coming to office of leftist presidents 
in several Latin American countries during the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, has since given way to a “blue tide” of conservative governments in the 
region. This might further the chances of convergence between the pro-market 
PA and other Latin American countries and regional organisations, above all 
with the members of MERCOSUR.  
 • Iván Duque assuming the presidency of Colombia in 2018 was interpreted by 
many as a sign of continuity in the country’s economic and commercial affairs. 
Nevertheless, it led to the temporary suspension of Colombia’s participation in 
the negotiations over the accession of associate members to the PA. 
 • The increasing disintegration of the Union of South American Nations led to 
the creation in March of this year of the Forum for the Progress and Develop-
ment of South America (PROSUR), wherein the defendants of a more aggres-
sive diplomacy approach to overthrowing Nicolás Maduro’s regime in Venezue-
la have gathered. In contrast to the rest of the PA members, Mexico did not join 
PROSUR. Some analysts fear that this could lead to additional disagreements 
within the PA.
Policy Implications
The successful expansion of the PA could position the organisation as one of the 
axes of a post–Trans-Pacific Partnership network of interregional free trade 
agreements (FTAs) connecting Asia-Pacific and the Americas. This would make 
it an attractive global partner for both Germany and the European Union, who 
are seeking to defend multilateralism within an international context of increas-
ing nationalism and protectionism. 
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The Ever-Changing Landscape of Regional Organisations
Changes to the regional system in Latin America have shifted both the opportuni-
ties and constraints for policymakers regarding regional organisations. The most 
important change to have occurred is an ideological one. A “blue tide” of right-wing 
conservative presidents has arrived in South America, almost completely replacing 
the left-wing “pink tide” current that emerged at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. [1] This ideological shift has only increased the burdens on regionalism.
First, Latin American regional organisations face increasing regional contesta-
tion from their own member states (for a broader assessment hereof, see Hooghe, 
Lenz, and Marks 2018). This contestation is connected to the domestic political 
dynamics in a number of countries of the region, where the right-wing governments 
that came to power in the most recent elections have furthered the “McCarthy-
isation” of the political debate by arguing that voting for any left-leaning party or 
political movement would bring about a “second Venezuela” and its “socialism of 
the twenty-first century” for their respective nations (Sanahuja 2019). Moreover, 
the governments elected on this platform have blamed the existing regional organi-
sations for their inaction in the face of the worsening human rights violations and 
rising authoritarianism witnessed in Venezuela (Mijares and Nolte 2018). [2] While 
existing regional organisations have been sidelined, new ad hoc mechanisms to deal 
with the Venezuelan situation have emerged – such as the Lima Group, the Monte-
video Mechanism, and the European Union-led Contact Group. The creation of a 
new regional setting called the Forum for the Progress and Development of South 
America (PROSUR), a forum from which Venezuela is excluded (Sanahuja 2019), is 
also a consequence of this rhetorical struggle. 
Second, ideological changes have led to a split among member states regard-
ing how to deal with the Venezuelan crisis, with knock-on effects for many Latin 
American regional organisations. While three Pacific Alliance (PA) member coun-
tries (Chile, Colombia, and Peru) are also ones of PROSUR, Mexico is not. The lat-
ter also participated in the Lima Group during the government of former president 
Sebastian Piñera, but has changed course under current president Andrés Manuel 
López Obrador (or AMLO, as he is commonly known). Mexico decided to create the 
Montevideo Mechanism together with Uruguay, Bolivia, and the Caribbean Com-
munity (CARICOM), promoting peaceful resolution to the Venezuelan crisis but 
without delivering an ultimatum on the exact date for the celebration of new elec-
tions. While these divergent approaches have raised concerns that they might bring 
about a fundamental divide within the PA, whose members until now shared a com-
mon view on the Venezuelan crisis and the need to harden the measures against and 
the pressure on Nicolás Maduro’s government, Mexico has important incentives to 
maintain its active participation in the PA. 
In the context of this new political cycle, despite the Alliance for the Peoples of 
our America (ALBA) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States 
(CELAC) having become increasingly paralysed, the worst-hit regional organisa-
tion so far has been the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), which was 
already in a stalemate due to the inability of its members to choose a General Secre-
tary since 2017. It then took two big hits with the suspension of the membership and 
payments of six member states in 2018, and the subsequent announcement of the 
exiting of Colombia from the organisation, made after Iván Duque took over the Co-
1  Some exceptions are 
Bolivia, Nicaragua, Vene-
zuela, and Mexico.
2 The Central American 
Integration System (SICA) 
has been able to maintain 
its institutional frame-
work by not activating its 
democratic clause, but this 
has not been without a 
loss of legitimacy due to its 
inaction in combatting the 
increasing anti-democratic 
repression by President 
Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua 
and the expulsion of the 
United Nations Com-
mission to investigate 
corruption in Guatemala by 
President Jimmy Morales 
(Sanahuja 2019: 111; on 
legitimacy and interna-
tional organisations more 
broadly, see Lenz and Viola 
2017).
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lombian presidency. Shortly after, UNASUR would start to rapidly disintegrate with 
the declared departures of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Paraguay too. 
Taken together, the phase of post-hegemonic regionalism that Latin America 
entered into with the arrival of the pink tide in the early years of the new century 
seems to be in crisis, and may even come to an end. Post-hegemonic regionalism 
sought to increase the autonomy of the region with regards to the influence of the 
United States, and promoted a non-commercial agenda of regional integration – 
including organisations such as UNASUR, ALBA, and CELAC (Riggirozzi and Tus-
sie 2012). The agenda of these organisations included, for example, crisis manage-
ment, security, infrastructure, political coordination, and social policy issues. 
In contrast, the blue tide is trying to put trade once again at the centre of re-
gional organisations’ focus as well as seeking closer bilateral relations with the 
US. The arrival of Mauricio Macri (2015) and Jair Bolsonaro (2019) to the Ar-
gentinian and Brazilian presidencies respectively has consolidated a “trade turn” 
from the more social and productive aspects of the Southern Common Market’s 
 (MERCOSUR) agenda, as emphasised under the region’s various centre-left gov-
ernments (Sanahuja 2019; Lenz 2012). This “trade first” policy has further fostered 
potential convergence between the PA and MERCOSUR. In addition, Brazil, Argen-
tina, and Ecuador have become observer states of the PA in the last few years. How-
ever, a complicating variable is Bolsonaro’s unilateral trade policies, which have 
already created tensions within Brazilian–Argentinian relations – that is, the main 
axis of MERCOSUR. 
In its ambition and setup, the PA antedated the ideological leanings of the blue 
tide. It was founded in 2011 by Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru to facilitate the 
free movement of capital, people, goods and services, and to promote “deep inte-
gration” between its members. Considering the lasting effects of the 2008 global 
financial crisis in the US and Europe, the founding PA members shared the idea 
that it was necessary to integrate their economies more closely with the Asia-Pacific 
region – which they deemed the most “dynamic” one in the world. This economic 
agenda at the regional level reflected a domestic neo-liberal strategy of insertion 
into the global economy that consists of signing free trade agreements (FTAs) and 
seeking to attract foreign direct investment, especially from more developed coun-
tries from other regions.
The founding members aim to use the PA as a platform to increase their com-
mercial exchange with Asia-Pacific – for which all of them, with the exception of 
Colombia, also participate in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) [3] and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) forum.  Some of the tools to do this have been: joint business and invest-
ment promotion; cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN); and, shared embassies in several countries around the globe.
The PA member states also attempt to project themselves as an “enlarged mar-
ket” of business-friendly countries, in order to attract foreign investment. For the 
same reason, they seek to sharply differentiate themselves from other states and 
regional organisations in the Latin American region, which they portray as being 
too protectionist – such as ALBA and MERCOSUR. This strategy has been labelled 
“nation branding” (Nolte 2016) or as the institutional contestation of Brazilian and 
Venezuelan regional leadership (Flemes and Castro 2018). 
3 Colombia applied in 
June 2018 to be included 
in the CPTPP.
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The Global Expansion of the PA
Since the emergence of the PA in 2011, the global political and economic contexts 
have changed significantly, and the institution has thus undergone reform so as 
to adapt. One of the most important shifts for the global order was the coming to 
power of Donald Trump and his subsequent policy of withdrawing the US from 
various international agreements that are considered fundamental to the contem-
porary liberal order. For instance, Trump withdrew the US from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), which groups together multiple countries from all sides of the 
Pacific Rim. 
This withdrawal from the TPP and the fears about a widespread return of global 
protectionism led the PA countries to convene a summit in Viña del Mar, Chile, in 
March 2017, which China and South Korea also attended. One of the most impor-
tant results was the creation of the category of “associated state” within the PA. 
This established the possibility for other states to join the PA as partners through 
the negotiation of trade agreements that are expected to follow the standards estab-
lished by the TPP. 
Taking these developments into account, it is possible to observe the emergence of 
a set of trade mega blocs between Asian and Latin American states plus Canada – ones 
in which the US does not participate. This process has been termed the construction 
of a “post-TPP interregionalism,” and has the PA as one of its leading axes (Pastrana 
and Castro 2018: 55). Closer cooperation between the PA and ASEAN constitutes a 
form of pure interregionalism (on how interregional relations between regional or-
ganisations may affect institutional design, see Lenz and Burilkov 2017; Duina and 
Lenz 2016). Negotiations that are in progress with the various candidates for asso-
ciated states are a form of hybrid interregionalism of the “state bloc” kind. Another 
version of post-TPP interregionalism would be the CPTPP, which entered into force 
in December 2018. Finally, it is important to highlight that for the US and other 
TPP members, one of the original ideas behind the TPP was also to balance the eco-
nomic influence of China in Asia-Pacific and to not let it dictate the rules of global 
trade. In this context, China is also leading a mega-bloc trade agreement called the 
Regional Comprehensive and Economic Partnership (RCEP) that overlaps in terms 
of its Asian members with the TPP (see Figure 1 below), and which has also sparked 
the interest of some Latin American countries too.
Figure 1 
Trade Mega Blocs and 
the PA
Source: Authors’ own 
elaboration.
Note: CAS-PA stands 
for candidate for as-
sociate membership of 
the PA.
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The XIV Summit of the PA and the Road Ahead
With the forthcoming XIV Presidential Summit in mind, the PA faces several chal-
lenges originating mainly from within. These arise largely from its institutional 
design and from the shifting ideological orientation of its members. The different 
approaches to dealing with the Venezuelan crisis might generate a small crack from 
the Mexican side in an otherwise unanimous “hard” (and ultimately ineffective) 
stance on Venezuela. 
However, Mexico has an important incentive not to disrupt the functioning of 
the PA: even after the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the US has proven to be a highly unreliable partner for the Mexicans. The 
latest threats from Trump are a clear signal in that regard. He has threatened to 
impose a 5 per cent tariff on all Mexican exports to the US, which could gradually 
reach as high as 25 per cent, if the government does not stop the flow of Central 
American migrants entering US territory via Mexico. 
In addition, AMLO has promised ever since his electoral campaign that he will 
concentrate on domestic rather than on international affairs; it is also pertinent to 
remember the broad ideological spectrum underpinning the coalition that brought 
him to power – which includes even the “evangelical right.” In a scenario of increas-
ing American protectionism, and despite the migration agreement achieved with 
the US, it seems unlikely that Mexico will alter its participation in the PA when the 
institution strengthens its ties to Latin America while also furthering the diversifi-
cation of Mexican exports’ destinations.
A more direct impact on the global expansion strategy of the PA has come from 
President Duque of Colombia. Following his electoral victory and subsequent seek-
ing to deliver on his campaign promise not to sign any trade agreements during his 
term in office, he announced in 2018 the suspension of the participation of Colom-
bia in the negotiations regarding the accession of associate member states to the 
PA. This was also due to concerns from the country’s meat, milk, sugar and auto-
parts sectors, which asked to be excluded from the negotiations due to the high 
competitiveness of the Asian economies. The national milk association even argued 
that Colombian producers could go out of business if they faced one of the world’s 
top producers, New Zealand. Recently, the Colombian government has announced 
that it will resume the negotiations, thus honouring the commitments of the previ-
ous administration, though it has promised to ask for the aforementioned sectors 
to be excluded from the agreement with New Zealand. This, however, maintains 
the uncertainty with regards to the continuation of Colombia’s application to the 
CPTPP, a process initiated by Duque’s predecessor. 
In contrast, regarding the applications of Ecuador and South Korea – which 
will also be discussed during the summit – there would not be much (if any) oppo-
sition from the Colombian side, as the country already has trade agreements with 
both countries. Notwithstanding, because of the aforementioned no FTA campaign 
promise, it is uncertain whether the Duque administration will continue to partici-
pate in the global expansion of the PA – making him a bigger danger to the ideologi-
cal convergence of the group. In this respect, the administration has also clashed 
with several UN agencies overseeing the implementation of the peace agreement 
with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC-EP) and 
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with other UN programs in the country by using anti-multilateral arguments that 
resemble Trump’s own discourse. 
This will need to be addressed at the presidential summit of 5–6 July 2019. The 
organisation announced in its “2030 Vision” that it plans to add 10 more associate 
members, as well as to foster cooperation with international organisations such as 
ASEAN, APEC, and the EU. There are also joint declarations in preparation with 
the EU, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
Eurasian Economic Commission, and with Japan regarding the upcoming summit.
Now, despite the trial by fire that the new political cycle in Latin America has 
posed to most of its regional organisations, the PA appears to have survived quite 
well so far – with a nearly unburned intra-institutional consensus. This reinforces 
its position for the years ahead as one of the possible core axes of a post-TPP or-
der based on mega-bloc trade agreements. This also makes it a desirable partner 
for those countries and organisations that want to continue advancing a free trade 
agenda and to uphold the defence of multilateral agreements and institutions. In 
this sense, the PA is also promoting closer cooperation with its 57 observer states – 
with more than 90 projects already on track. It has created a Cooperation Council, a 
Forum for Technical Cooperation, and a Cooperation Fund while there is also a very 
appealing cooperation agenda proposal to expand the collaboration with observer 
states (see Jarrín, Gardini, and Ramírez 2019). 
In times of simmering trade wars and tensions within the US–EU transatlantic 
alliance, this summit might, then, be of particular interest for the EU. Expressly so 
considering that: 1) the EU has already signed FTAs with the members of the PA 
and is in the process of modernising its treaties with Chile and Mexico; 2) there is 
a significant number of European states (28) who are observers in the PA; 3) after 
twenty years of negotiation, the MERCOSUR-EU trade agreement has finally been 
concluded and is pending ratification, this brings the EU much closer to the Atlan-
tic side of Latin America and leaves the possibility to strengthen its economic ties 
with the Pacific one as a possible next course of action; 4) The EU can advance this 
last point while also promoting its values as the clause to respect the Paris Climate 
Agreement in the agreement with the MERCOSUR has shown; and, 5) there is a 
need to counteract anti-democratic tendencies within the region partly enabled by 
the increasing presence of China.
Latin America does not fall far from the general rise of authoritarianism and 
extreme-right political movements currently being witnessed around the world. 
Here a value-oriented EU–Latin American alliance might make sense to help con-
solidate democracy, to boost the economic development of the region, and to work 
bi-regionally on the defence of international multilateralism (Reith 2019). In these 
regards, Germany has recently started a “Latin America and the Caribbean Initia-
tive” to deepen its own engagement. As a first step in this direction, the EU and its 
members could foster closer relations with the PA, explore the possibility of associ-
ate membership to articulate themselves to these trade mega blocs (especially after 
the complications in the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), widen 
the inter-institutional cooperation agenda, and ensure the coordination of strate-
gies within international forums.
The temporary suspension of Colombia in the negotiations over the accession 
of associate members might serve as a cautionary tale vis-à-vis the weaknesses of 
the institutional design of the PA. Mainly, regarding the required unanimity of its 
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decision-making procedures – as this could easily lead to an organisational crisis. 
This is less likely to happen to the PA in comparison to other Latin American re-
gional organisations, though, due to the small number of members, their reluctance 
to partake in divisive and more politicised issues such as the Venezuelan crisis, and 
the continuity of their neo-liberal strategy of insertion in the international economy 
throughout the last few decades. However, as the title of the renowned salsa song 
by Héctor Lavoe goes: Todo tiene su final (“Everything has its ending”) – that is 
to say, the PA should expect the best, but properly prepare for the worst given the 
ever-shifting political dynamics of Latin America. 
The XIV Presidential Summit should also serve as an opportunity for PA mem-
bers to take a breath and reflect on the goals of the institution. As outlined, the 
organisation has a decent shot at helping the member states’ economies integrate 
into Asian markets, and even into others elsewhere too. yet, it might also become 
a victim of its own success. The very competitive and value-added products coming 
from the Asian economies could worsen the already heavy dependence of most of 
the PA’s member states on the export of commodities, as has already been happen-
ing in their increasing exchanges with China. 
For example, one of the main tools to add value to PA exports to Asia-Pacific 
could be a strong policy to construct regional value chains between members – this 
could also help increase the currently low intra-institutional trade, which is only 
around 3 per cent. In spite of this being one of the foundational proposals of the 
PA, however, the actions to actually advance it have come up short so far, as mem-
ber states have only identified possible chains and shared this information with 
economic actors. The building of these chains, in contrast, will require significant 
incentives and policies being put forward, for which the superficial and strongly in-
tergovernmental structure of the PA might not suffice. At least a technical secretary 
might be needed to decisively advance in this regard. Interestingly, at this point the 
convergence with MERCOSUR might be critical to creating even more and wider 
value chains in the region; this topic is already on the roadmap that the two organi-
sations have designed in order to come together in certain areas.
Finally, in order to achieve these goals, to fulfil its 2030 Vision, and to integrate 
more closely into the international economy with concrete benefits for member 
states and their populations, the PA will have to invest substantially more resources 
in, among other areas, research and development, national and regional infrastruc-
ture, and education. It will also have to offer something more than just trade agree-
ments to its associate members. Further, it will also have to go considerably beyond 
the strategy of simply seeking to attract foreign investment and of signing FTAs. 
This will also entail compiling a more detailed design of the concrete means and 
actions necessary to live up to its lofty vision. 
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